The Second Assault on Fort Wagner, July 18, 1863: The account of Henry F. W. Little, Seventh New Hampshire Volunteers

On July 18, 1863, Private Paul Whipple's regiment, the Seventh New Hampshire Volunteers, led the second brigade into Fort Fisher at the mouth of Charleston harbor.  The 54th Massachusetts had been given the honor of leading the first brigade to charge the fort and has for good reason received the most attention, but the charge of the Seventh and the Second Brigade met a similar fate. So much will be said about that in the days surrounding the assault, that we can add only that the 54th Mass and Seventh New Hampshire were not strangers to each other and would again fight alongside each other.  Henry Little notes that because of disease, the Seventh could only muster about 480 officers and troops for the attack. 

"The morning of the 19th was Sunday, and an inspection of the troops upon the island was ordered, and only nine officers and two hundred and fifty-eight men appeared on the line of the Seventh New Hampshire as present for duty." ---Henry F. W. Little. The Seventh Regiment New Hampshire Volunteers in the War of the Rebellion. Seventh New Hampshire Veterans Association, Concord, N. H., 1896.

Plan of Fort Wagner

THE SECOND ASSAULT ON FORT WAGNER. 

COOPERATION OF THE NAVY. THE DEAFENING ROAR OF ONE HUNDRED HEAVY GUNS AND MORTARS. GENERAL GILLMORE HOLDS A COUNCIL OF WAR. AN ASSAULT DETERMINED UPON. THE FIRST BRIGADE UNDER GENERAL STRONG TO LEAD. THE SECOND BRIGADE UNDER COLONEL PUTNAM ORDERED IN AS SUPPORT.

THE FIRST BRIGADE UNSUCCESSFUL. THE SECOND BRIGADE REACH THE FORT AND HOLD A SALIENT FOR AN HOUR AND A HALF. FAILURE OF THE THIRD BRIGADE TO COME TO OUR ASSISTANCE. THE DEATH

OF COLONEL PUTNAM, CAPTAIN BROWN, AND LIEUTENANTS CATE, BAKER, BRYANT, BENNETT, AND LANE ON OR NEAR THE WORKS. — CAPTAINS LEAVITT AND HOUSE AND LIEUTENANTS DAVIS AND WORCESTER MORTALLY WOUNDED. THE ASSAULT A FAILURE.

THE LOSS OF THE SEVENTH NEW HAMPSHIRE TWO HUNDRED AND SIXTEEN.

On the morning of July 18, considerable commotion was noticed in the different camps of the troops on the island, and the weather was warm and sultry. The previous night had been warm and showery, and as we fell in for our rations of hard-tack and coffee, not a man in the command for a moment thought the day would be made memorable by a land and naval bombardment of uncommon severity, and would end in a second and bloody assault upon Fort Wagner and a disastrous repulse to the Union forces.
[116]
However, about 9 o'clock a. m., the troops on the island were ordered out from their camps among the sand-hills, under arms and in light marching order, upon the beach.  A large number from the Seventh New Hampshire had been detailed for fatigue duty the night before, and during violent thunder showers, had worked until nearly daybreak, supplying the gun and mortar batteries with ammunition which was to be used in bombarding Fort Wagner. The monitors and the new "Ironsides" [USS New Ironsides] at once moved up and engaged Fort Wagner, and a steady fire was kept up until about noon, which was vigorously returned by the guns of Forts Wagner, Gregg, Sumter, Moultrie, and the batteries on James Island. Owing to the heavy rains of the previous night it was nearly noon before the land batteries could open fire.

USS New Ironsides

The troops gathered upon the beach, stacked arms, and quietly rested at will, interesting themselves largely in watching the firing of our fleet. At noon the different company cooks brought us from the camping-grounds near by, our rations of hard-tack and coffee, and at 12.30 Company D, under command of First Lieut. Wm. C. Knowlton, was ordered to the battery on the left of our works, for the purpose of throwing up a further protection of earthworks in front of the battery, which was accomplished inside of a half-hour, and the company returned to the regiment on the beach. Shortly after 12 o'clock Rear-Admiral Dahlgren, having his flag on the monitor "Montauk," accompanied by four monitors and the new "Ironsides," and these followed by five wooden gunboats, closed in toward Fort Wagner, and together with the land batteries opened a terrific fire, and the roar of heavy ordnance was deafening. The wooden gunboats kept up a slow but accurate fire from their large pivot Parrott rifled guns, and very effectually shelled Fort Wagner, while they were wholly out of range of the guns of the fort, but the shell-[117] ing from the fleet and land batteries combined was so severe, that nearly all the troops of the enemy, both infantry and artillerists, were compelled to seek safety in the bomb-proofs. The guns were all silenced on the south or land side of the fort, and nearly silenced on the sea front; for in most instances the gunners were driven completely away from their guns.

Morris Island: watching USS New Ironsides firing on Rebel positions

At midday General Gillmore, who was on the island, rode up with his staff', and ascending the lookout which had been erected on the sand-hills near the beach, and just opposite the left of our regiment, watched, through his lorgnette, the effect of the shells. During that seemingly long summer afternoon the troops on the beach witnessed one of the grandest of bombardments by land and naval forces that had taken place since the commencement of the war. 

The forces on Morris Island were commanded by Brig. Gen. Truman Seymour, and the infantry was arranged in three brigades, the First under command of Brig. Gen. George C. Strong, was composed of the Forty-eighth New York, Col. W. B. Barton: Seventy-sixth Pennsylvania, Capt. J. S. Littell; Third New Hampshire, Col. J. H. Jackson ; Sixth Connecticut, Col. J. L. Chatfield ; Ninth Maine, Col. S. Emery; with the Fifty-fourth Massachusetts (colored), Col. Robert G. Shaw. The Second Brigade under command of Col. H. S. Putnam, of the Seventh N. H. Volunteers, consisted of the Seventh New Hampshire, Lieut. Co.. J. C. Abbott; One Hundredth New York, Col. G. B. Dandy; Sixty-second Ohio, Col. F. B. Pond; Sixty-seventh Ohio, Col. A. C. Voris. The Third Brigade, which took no active part in this second assault upon Fort Wagner, was commanded by Brig. Gen. T. G. Stevenson, and consisted of four excellent regiments from the forces of General Terry, which had just arrived from James Island. These troops were made up [118] of fine material, were led by competent officers, and were composed largely of regiments belonging to the Tenth Corps, with a few regiments which had formerly belonged to the Thirteenth Corps, which had been discontinued on June 11, and a few of the regiments of that corps had been transferred to the Department of the South. 

Bombardment of Ft. Wagner.  USS New Ironsides can be seen on lower right.

Col. R. T. Graham, who had commanded the Confederate forces on Morris Island during the engagements on the l0th and 11th, had been relieved on the morning of the 14th by Brig. Gen. William B. Taliaferro, who at once placed their fortifications in the best possible condition for defense, and the Confederate garrisons were largely increased.

The tide serving about 4 o'clock p. m., the iron-clads closed in to within about three hundred yards of Wagner, and the mortars and guns of the land batteries and every available gun of the naval forces now opened with renewed energy, and the sixty-four guns and mortars of our land and naval forces combined, were promptly answered by the heavy guns, some thirty or more, of Forts Sumter and Moultrie, Battery Gregg, and the heavy batteries on James Island ; the deafening roar of about one hundred guns of the heaviest calibre, worked with such rapidity, seemed almost unbroken. Rear-Admiral Dahlgren received a signal from General Gillmore during the afternoon, informing him that an assault would be made at twilight. This signal, it seems, was read by the Confederates, but the increased attack from the land batteries and the fleet would naturally forestall such an event. In the midst of this heavy firing a boat crew was called for, and the old crew of the colonel's barge at St. Augustine at once responded, under Corporal Palmer, of Company F, and rowed out to one of the advanced monitors, to carry an officer, with a communication from the general. The damage in our trenches from the heavy fire of the enemy [119] during the day, had been slight. A caisson was exploded in one of our batteries by a shell, and a few casualties occurred. Our earthworks had been carefully constructed, and afforded our artillerists considerable protection. 

From our position on the beach we could see the shells exploding in and around the fort, the clouds of dust rising high in the air, as they plunged into the loose sand of which it was built. Three times the rebel colors were shot away, and as many times a few daring men came out upon the parapet and raised them again. Ignorant as was everyone, from the commanding general down, of the construction of the fort, it seemed as if that shower of ponderous missiles, bursting all around them, must destroy or drive away the garrison. However, we were soon to be undeceived. Long and dreary seemed the hours of the afternoon as we lay upon the hot sand of the beach, scorching in the rays of an unclouded sun, and speculating upon the results of the bombardment. Just before sundown General Gillmore called up his brigade commanders, with General Seymour, and upon Colonel Putnam's return we learned that an assault had been determined on, — contrary to his advice, as he said. "I told the general," said he, "I did not think we could take the fort so, but Seymour overruled me; Seymour is a devil of a fellow for dash." To Major Henderson he remarked, "We are all going into Wagner like a flock of sheep." Immediately upon Colonel Putnam's return the regiment was ordered to fall in, and we could hear the commands given in the brigade in our front. We have no doubt that our troops had been seen all day upon the beach from the lookouts at Fort Sumter, and that they knew we were massing troops for some purpose. The dysentery, which prevailed among the troops while on Folly Island, had enormously swelled the sick-list of the Seventh, and the adjutant that morning at roll-call reported to the brigade commander but four [120] hundred and eighty officers and men present for duty after the line was formed.

Seventh New Hampshire Sergeant's Uniform

The regiments of the Second Brigade formed in column by companies, the Seventh New Hampshire leading, it being the regiment of the ranking colonel. It was then we knew full well the meaning of such a movement, and as the rays of a glorious sunset shone upon the bright, fixed bayonets of our troops, it blended with the pale, uplifted faces of our comrades, whose firm, resolutely compressed features we knew meant "victory or death." Not a man asked to leave the line. There was no apparent show of fear upon those visages, as we looked along the line in pride at the noble representation from the Old Granite State, and, probably, not one in those crowded columns realized at that moment that perhaps one fourth of their number would be "mustered out" ere the rising of another sun.

The command, "Forward," was given. The Fifty-fourth Massachusetts (colored) had already left the advance works on the double-quick, with the brave Col. Robert G. Shaw at their head, closely followed by the First Brigade under dashing Gen. George C. Strong, and they in turn supported at half brigade distance by the Second Brigade under the gallant Putnam, of the Seventh New Hampshire, whose soldierly bearing instilled more courage into his troops, than any officer we ever saw in the service during the whole period of the war. We shall never forget the scene. As he sat on his horse, facing the left flank of his brigade (which was then in column by company), attired in a common soldier's blouse without straps, he looked every inch a soldier.

The 54th Mass. Attacks Fort Wagner

As soon as the Second Brigade had passed our outer line of works, the firing of our batteries and the fleet at once ceased, and Colonel Putnam deployed his brigade into column by battalions, and the different regiments of the [121] brigade closed up to less than half distance. So narrow was the neck of land between our advanced works and Fort Wagner, that, small -as was our regiment in numbers, only six companies could dress in line, and consequently four companies had to march en echelon to the rear. Then as if aroused from sleep Fort Wagner opened its batteries. Its heavy siege guns, howitzers, and forty-two-pounders poured a fearful cross fire of grape and canister upon the narrow neck of sand along which the crowded columns of the storming party must advance, while the profile of the parapet of Fort Wagner was outlined against the dark thunder clouds rising behind, by' the sparkling fire of the rifles of the garrison, who, secure in their immense bomb-proof during the long hours of the bombardment, had sprung to the parapet upon its cessation, to repel the expected assault. Besides the storm of iron hail from Forts Wagner, Sumter, and Moultrie, and Battery Gregg, all the batteries on James Island were throwing shells and shrapnel, and the nearer ones grape and canister, working their guns for all they were worth, plowing wide swaths through our ranks, which, however, were quickly closed. For a moment the brigade was halted, at the moment that the regiment under Shaw, and the First Brigade struck the enemy's picket line — which time the writer of this occupied in placing a tourniquet upon one of the men in Company D, Hinckley D. Harris, by name, whose right leg was badly shattered at the knee by a grapeshot, and we had barely time to affix the instrument, the grape and canister in the meantime splashing the water into our faces; for the left of the regiment then stood in the edge of the marsh on the left of the narrow neck of land, and the water was a foot deep or more where we stood — when we heard the ringing command, "Forward," from Colonel Putnam, who was ever on the alert to have his brigade on time; besides which we distinctly remember [122] the order given by Lieutenant-Colonel Abbott, which was, "Seventh New Hampshire, keep closed on the colors."

Springing to their feet the line pushed on into a storm of shot that seemed to fill the air like the drops of a summer shower, after that it was hard to know or hear any command, as there was such a noise from the shells and guns, together with the shrieks and cries of the wounded. All this time it was growing darker, and upon nearing the coveted works we went in on the double-quick. We passed their outer works and opened to let the remnant of the First Brigade with Shaw's broken battalion pass through on their way to the rear, for they had nobly borne the first shock, their onset being so fierce and heavy that they were badly shattered, and the Second Brigade had the front.

Closing up as well as possible the regiment reached the ditch, a trench with sloping sides, some fifty feet in width, five in depth ; and for the whole length of the south front waist deep in water and soft mud, though at the southeast angle and along the sea front it was dry. This ditch was enfiladed by heavy howitzers, which kept up a constant fire of grape and canister, and the sides and angles of the fort and the ditch itself were covered with the dead and wounded. In the angles of the ditch especially we noticed they lay piled one upon another, and there was no chance to get down into the ditch without climbing over these bodies.

  

Before starting on this charge Colonel Putnam directed that the cap should be removed from the rifles, as our dependence must be on the bayonet should we come to fighting. In the regiment just behind us (the One Hundredth New York), this order was neglected, Colonel Dandy saying that his men never fired without orders, a statement sadly and signally disproved within an hour. The right of the regiment crossed the ditch near the southeast angle. [123] and found a small portion of the First Brigade on the parapet near that angle; the companies on the left finding the ditch in their immediate front impassable, crowded around to the right, and crossed the ditch near the same angle, while the four companies en echelon, passed clear around the right, and some of them scaled the parapet of the fort upon its sea face. The next regiment in our rear (the One Hundredth New York) came promptly up to the ditch and in the darkness, which was only lighted up by the flashes of the guns, saw the parapet covered with men, and supposing them to be Confederates, fired into them, undoubtedly killing and wounding many of our men. As it had now become very dark we could only see our way when the flashes of the rebel guns which swept the moat, lit up the ghastly scene for a moment only, but at short intervals. But we mounted the parapet of the fort, only to find that the stronghold was so constructed as to be almost impregnable; and some mistake or delay in giving orders to General Stevenson, prevented the Third Brigade coming to our aid. It was now nearly 10 o'clock. 

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We had already driven the rebel gunners from some of the nearest guns, but only to find that other guns which we had not seemed to find in the darkness, swept the traverses. After waiting for reinforcements, and holding the whole southern face of the stronghold until it was impossible to stop longer, our ranks having become so badly thinned and broken, we retired in as good and quick order as possible under the circumstances, for it was about as difficult to pfet back as it was to go on. Therefore, after some skillful engineering, as we thought, to escape the missiles thrown after us, the remnant of our brigade reported at our outer line of entrenchments where we found the Third Brigade drawn up in line to resist any sortie the enemy might make, and leaving on the field behind us and at the fort upwards of six hundred of our brave com- [124] rades, among them our heroic brigade commander, who was shot through the head and instantly killed on the parapet.

The loss of the Seventh New Hampshire in this assault was two hundred and sixteen killed, wounded, and missing, and of this number eighteen were officers, eleven of whom — including our gallant and beloved colonel — were either slain outright or mortally wounded and left in the enemy's hands.

After crossing the ditch all regimental action ceased, and each action seemed an individual one, and will be best illustrated by quoting from the narrative of Adjt. Henry G. Webber, who says: "Crossing the ditch at or near the southeast angle, I found myself, on reaching the crest of the parapet, in a corner where the bomb-proof, rising some six feet higher than the parapet, afforded a protection in front from the enemy's fire, and crowded upon the parapet, the slope of the bomb-proof, and in the corner were one or two hundred men from all the regiments in both brigades, among whom the few that I could make out as belonging to the Seventh New Hampshire were scattered. It was in vain that I tried in the tumultuous crowd, to get them together. All was wild uproar, with the groans and cries of the wounded: men calling for their officers, officers calling for their men, and many in wild excitement yelling with no apparent object but to add to the confusion. Captain Brown, of Company K, stood upon the bombproof, trying in vain to excite some men to follow him. Captain Rollins, of Company F, Lieutenants Knowlton and Bennett, of Company D, had all crossed at the same point, and no two men who stood together belonged to the same company, if by chance to the same regiment. 

Colonel Putnam, delayed by his horse being shot from under him, now appeared upon the fort, and ordered an attempt to charge and silence one of the guns that flanked [125 ] the sea face, and still swept the top and sides of the bomb-proof with grape.

Lieutenant Bennett and myself then joined Captain Brown upon the top of the bomb-proof, and a few men moved to follow us. The position of the gun could be plainly seen in the gathering darkness, by the burning fragments of cartridges before its muzzle, but right across the path yawned a wide, deep, black pit — an opening into the bomb-proof in rear of a seaward embrasure, up from which came occasional shots. To the left was apparently a chance to get around, but the road was blocked by a crowd of men, sitting, lying, or standing; some disabled by wounds, some apparently paralyzed by fear. As we attempted to force a path through them a shell burst in our midst. Bennett was killed. Brown mortally wounded, and one of my legs went out from under me, and refused duty. The men fell back and I crawled over the edge of the bomb-proof again, among the increasing throng of wounded and dying, to see how much I was hurt, and was relieved to find it more of a bruise than a wound, from which the numbness soon began to pass away.

"Colonel Putnam went up on the bomb-proof, and endeavored to get up a charge, but in vain  after which, drawing his men into the crowded corner of the fort, he endeavored to hold out until reinforcements, for which he had sent, should arrive. The enemy made one charge upon us, but were driven back by our fire. Shortly afterwards a ball through the head stretched Colonel Putnam among the slain, just as he had announced to Captain Rollins his determination to hold out to the last. Major Butler, Sixty-seventh Ohio, Captain Rollins, and myself, were now the only officers left, and the small force of men was woefully thinned, while the dead and dying were piled over the small space we held. [126] "So long a time had elapsed since reinforcements were sent for, that Major Butler began to tear that the officer who was sent had failed to cross the belt of tire that still swept the outside of the ditch, and expecting a charge every moment, to which our small force could oppose but feeble resistance, he at last gave the order to retreat, and taking a last shot over the bomb-proof, we silently skedaddled toward our lines."

Five officers fell before reaching the moat which surrounded the work. Of the line, Captain Brown and Lieutenants Cate, Baker, Bennett, and Bryant, fell dead on or near the works. Captain Leavitt lived until he reached Charleston. Captain House died of his wounds in October, and Lieutenants Davis and Worcester died on board transports, after they were exchanged. All other wounded officers recovered. It is an historical fact that in this assault the Seventh New Hampshire lost more officers than any other regiment in any one engagement during the war. 

General Strong and Colonel Chatfield, of the Sixth Connecticut, had fallen mortally wounded near the fort, while leading the First Brigade, and General Seymour was severely wounded by a grape-shot, while the Second Brigade was moving up, and was obliged to leave the field.

Had the Third Brigade come to the assistance of the Second Brigade on the evening of the assault on Fort Wagner, and sent two of its regiments around the sea front of the fort to the rear of that stronghold, the Union forces would have taken the fort and its garrison; and instead of smashing two good brigades upon the fortified front of such a formidable earthwork, a portion of one of the brigades engaged, would have been sufficient to hold the front while two good regiments passing around the work to the rear, which was almost wholly unprotected, and which movement would have been a feasible one, would [127]
have successfully terminated the assault. Why our general officers who had the advantage of a military education should have seemingly overlooked the advantage of such a movement is not clearly comprehensible. Even noted Confederate authorities seem never to have given a thought to the accomplishment of such a movement, which could have been easily made, and the long and arduous siege and consequent loss of life have been averted. Such a movement would also have shown conclusively the fault of constructing a formidable earthwork with the rear almost wholly unprotected.

The morning of the 19th was Sunday, and an inspection of the troops upon the island was ordered, and only nine officers and two hundred and fifty-eight men appeared on the line of the Seventh New Hampshire as present for duty. 

 

Company C had lost every commissioned officer. First Lieut. Virgil H. Cate had only lately been exchanged and returned to the regiment, and was acting aide-de-camp to Colonel Putnam. Second Lieut. Andrew J. Lane was killed before reaching the fort. Of the two hundred enlisted men who were either killed, wounded, or missing, I desire to speak in particular, because without them where would the glory and fame of our regiment have been? Good, faithful, brave men and tried even unto death. They were of the best we had. Their memory we shall ever cherish, and as we recall the faces and pronounce the names of those comrades who were missing on that eventful evening of July 18, 1863, we find they were men whom we would have chosen for any emergency. First Sergts. Gilbert F. Dustin, of Company D ; Alexander S. Stevens, of Company E; Thomas F. Meader, of Company F; Charles C. McPherson, of Company I: and Jacob W. West, of Company G, who died of his wounds August 5, "went in to stay," and the loss of these five first sergeants [128] was sadly felt by the companies to which they belonged. Only a few, a very few of our wounded men ever came back to us. Nearly all of our missing comrades proved to have been either killed or wounded and died in rebel hands. The squad of men who were captured from Company D, at St. Augustine, Fla., had been returned but a short time to the regiment, and some of them were that evening either killed or again captured. At least no tidings ever came of them. Every company had its list of killed and wounded, and scores of New Hampshire homes went into mourning for those who never returned.

The men who were wounded were generally found to be seriously so, making it very much the worse for them, as it was impossible to get those badly wounded comrades back to our lines ; and as we were compelled to retreat on the double-quick, those who had not been able to get back by their own efforts, and those who were left near the rebel works had to be left to the mercy of rebel hands. 

 ---Henry F. W. Little. The Seventh Regiment New Hampshire Volunteers in the War of the Rebellion. Seventh New Hampshire Veterans Association, Concord, N. H., 1896.

Fort Wagner, July 19, 1863. Harper's

The Union Descent Upon Morris Island, S.C., July 9-10, 1863. - The Seventh New Hampshire Volunteers

Colors of the Seventh New Hampshire, 1865

Capt. Paul Whipple and the Seventh New Hampshire Volunteers in the Civil War:
The Descent Upon Morris Island - Mobilization, Assault, and Missed Opportunities in the days before the Assaults on Fort Wagner.

On July 9th and 10th, the Seventh New Hampshire participated in the Union's successful occupation of the lower two-thirds of Morris Island, putting them "within 600 yards" of Fort Wagner.  Henry Little notes that the reluctance of the commanding officer to push forward and attack Fort Wagner was a major blunder, allowing the Confederate forces to be reinforced during the night and thus resulting in the carnage that would follow during the first and second assaults on Fort Wagner.  

We believe had an assault at once been made on Wagner that we should have had the island by sunset wholly in our possession, but for some unaccountable reason this was not done, and was undoubtedly a grave mistake on the part of our commanding general, which was afterwards more fully demonstrated in all our minds, and all Confederate authorities on the subject unite in the opinion that the Union Army lost a great opportunity in not assaulting Fort Wagner that evening.(Little, 1896:109)

What follows are accounts of the action by Henry Little, Medal of Honor recipient and historian of the Seventh New Hampshire Volunteer Regiment,  John Johnson,  Chief Confederate engineer at Fort Sumter, and Episcopal clergyman of Charleston, South Carolina, and Quincy Adams Gillmore, Commander of the Union 10th Corps, which included the forces on Folly and Morris Islands.

Henry F. W. Little

Henry F. W. Little. The Seventh Regiment New Hampshire Volunteers in the War of the Rebellion. Seventh New Hampshire Veterans Association, Concord, N. H.

 

John Johnson

 John Johnson. 1890.  The defense of Charleston harbor, including Fort Sumter and the adjacent islands.  Charleston, S.C., Walker, Evans & Cogswell co.

 General Quincy Adams Gillmore with his horse and tent at Morris Island, South Carolina, 1863.

Quincy Adams Gillmore. 1865. Engineer and artillery operations against the defences of Charleston Harbor in 1863 : comprising the descent upon Morris Island, the demolition of Fort Sumter, the reduction of Forts Wagner and Gregg; with observations on heavy ordnance, fortifications, etc. New York: D. Van Nostrand.

 Henry Little's account:

During the afternoon of the 9th, the company cooks brought up our rations, and a detail was sent back for our rubber blankets, and during the early hours of the morning of the loth, the brush in front of our masked batteries was carefully removed and the embrasures were carefully shoveled out, long before the early dawn. Major John- [108] son, in his book entitled, "The Defense of Charleston Harbor," says, "some cutting away of brushwood from the front of the concealed works had already been heard by the Confederates, but as there was no removal of the brush, the batteries continued to be undiscovered up to the last moment." And he further says, "Capt. Charles T. Haskell, Jr., of the Twenty-first S. C. Volunteers, scouting from Morris Island, in a small boat, made discovery of the barges moored in the creek back of Folly Island, and that even this discovery failed to alarm the defenders of Morris Island as it should have done," which shows how securely the secret of our work had been kept, and how well the suspicions of the garrison and pickets of the Confederates on Morris Island had been allayed.

On the night of July 9, and about thirty hours after the departure of General Terry's expedition. Brig. Gen. George C. Strong embarked his command in boats or barges at a point near the southwestern extremity of Folly Island, and cautiously proceeded up the creek toward the north end of the island, and near the left of Little Folly Island, and awaited the opening of our batteries.

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 Just before 4 o'clock on the morning of the loth, the regiment was ordered to move back a short distance from the batteries, when we were formed in line, and were ordered to support the batteries. The morning dawned pleasant and beautiful, but the atmosphere was close and sultry; a little after 4 o'clock the forty-seven guns and mortars opened from our batteries on Little Folly Island, and were shortly afterward joined by the guns from the monitors, in the harbor, which made a formidable crossfire on the rebel works; and the music of these heavy guns in support of the land batteries was terrific. The rebel forces on Morris Island were so taken by surprise at so heavy an onset that it was some little time before they could get their batteries at work, and then came the fire [109] from Forts Gregg and Wagner at the north end, and from all the guns in the batteries at the south end of Morris Island that the rebels could bring into use, and for nearly three hours this heavy bombardment was kept up. About 7 o'clock General Strong's brigade, awaiting patiently for orders to cross, quickly rowed their barges from the cover of Little Folly Island, and at once pulled for the Morris Island shore, crossing Lighthouse Inlet near the left of Little Folly Island, and under. a heavy infantry lire and the fire of the batteries on the south end of Morris Island a landing was made, line formed, and the rifle-pits and batteries at once charged and taken ; this success was at once followed by the crossing of the Seventh in barges, immediately in front of our batteries, and with other troops who came after us we were formed in support of General Strong's brigade. The batteries on the south end of Morris Island were captured with about two hundred of the rebel garrison, the remainder of their forces were soon skedaddling up the island towards Fort Wagner, and our advance followed them up and a little beyond the Beacon House, and at 9 o'clock two thirds of the island was ours. We believe had an assault at once been made on Wagner that we should have had the island by sunset wholly in our possession, but for some unaccountable reason this was not done, and was undoubtedly a grave mistake on the part of our commanding general, which was afterwards more fully demonstrated in all our minds, and all Confederate authorities on the subject unite in the opinion that the Union Army lost a great opportunity in not assaulting Fort Wagner that evening.

The rebels in their haste to get out of harm's way were obliged to leave almost everything behind, and we found a great variety of articles in their camps, including equipments, arms, ammunition, clothing, muster-rolls, and the personal baggage of the officers and men. We found this [110] island to be more of a sand haste than the one we had just left, with scarcely a half-dozen trees, and very few shrubs upon it; but we were nearer Charleston.

Early in the afternoon First Lieutenant Worcester, of Company H, with a detail from the regiment, advanced as skirmishers and established a picket line where the first parallel was afterwards located. These pickets were under a constant fire of musketry from Fort Wagner, but the distance was so great that the force of the bullets was nearly spent before reaching us. A ten-inch mortar shell fell during the afternoon, within a few yards of the pickets stationed on the beach, which fortunately did not explode, and consequently did no harm.

The fleet followed up the advantage gained by the land forces and the ironclads steamed in close to Fort Wagner, and firing occasional shells helped to keep the rebels from establishing a heavy- picket line in our immediate front during the day.

About 4 o'clock p. m. the Seventh was ordered to the front and took its station near the Beacon House, which was only about four thousand yards from Fort Sumter, from which fort a halt-dozen guns had been firing upon our advancing troops since 10 o'clock a. m., including two powerful Brooke rifles, one of which was fractured five day's after. The day was intensely hot and the men suffered for water. Small details of men were sent back to Folly Island with loads of empty canteens, and we got a small amount of food from the bags of those rebels who were forced to drop them in their hurry to get back to Wagner. The average Confederate haversack as we found it on Morris Island, consisted of a meal sack with a long string tied around the mouth and fastened to the roundabout belt in front, and slung back over the left shoulder, which was easily got rid of by cutting the string at the roundabout, letting the bag fall off over the shoulder [111] behind. We remember to have personally captured one of these bags, and found a conglomeration of uncooked rice, corn meal, and a small piece of plug tobacco, which we eagerly divided with another comrade, who in return gave us a graham pilot biscuit, some black beans, and a piece of bacon which he had taken from another bag.

As the shades of evening settled down around us. Lieutenant Worcester's men were relieved by a new detail, and the picket line was advanced further to the front, the line extending across the island. We occupied with our reserve the line of ground which had been occupied by our pickets during the day, and where was afterwards constructed the first parallel, beyond the Beacon House, which all who were present at the siege of Morris Island will well remember. At dark the firing almost wholly ceased, and the men who were weary and worn with the severe fatigue of the day, after throwing up a slight breastwork, lay down on the sand-hills in line, and soon forgot their hardships and were dreaming of their homes far away, and no one could foretell what the morrow might bring forth. Our pickets were now within six hundred yards of Fort Wagner, and a line of pickets was established by the rebels during the night, immediately in our front, and occupying a ridge extending entirely across the island. -- Henry F. W. Little. The Seventh Regiment New Hampshire Volunteers in the War of the Rebellion. Seventh New Hampshire Veterans Association, Concord, N. H., 1896, pages 107-111)

  Sketch of the Descent on Morris Island as seen from the Union batteries on Folly Island. The Seventh New Hampshire can be seen landing in the middle right. https://www.digitalcommonwealth.org/search/commonwealth-oai:qn59sv11f  https://library.bc.edu/iiif/view/becker_4727

 

 

 
 Johnson's (Confederate) account, from John Johnson. 1890.  The defense of Charleston harbor, including Fort Sumter and the adjacent islands. 

The Union batteries on Little Folly Island were reported ready for attack on the 6th of July, and orders were issued by [88] Brigadier-General Gillmore, commanding, to open fire and advance on the night of the 8th, barges being collected for the purpose; but no attack was made at that time. It was on this night of the 8th-9th that Captain Charles T. Haskell, Jr., scouting from Morris Island in a small boat, made discovery of the barges moored in the creek back of Folly Island. Even this discovery failed to alarm the defender's of Morris Island, as it should have done; for Brigadier-General Ripley, as already mentioned, reported none but light defensive works across the inlet" up to the 8th or 9th of July."

 Another time set for the attack was the morning of the 9th,but bad weather and other unfavorable circumstances caused a second postponement. Some cutting away of brushwood from the front of the concealed works had already been heard by the Confederates, but as there was no removal of the brush, the batteries continued to be undiscovered up to the last moment.

On this day, however, the 9th, a division of troops, supported by gunboats, began the movements, demonstrating on James Island by way of the Stono River, and an expedition set out from Beaufort to cut the Savannah Railroad at the Edisto. Of these more will be said farther on.

Soon after daybreak, about five o'clock, on the 10th day of July, a close, sultry morning, the batteries were finally unmasked and opened upon Morris Island. Some attack was looked for by the Confederates, but not such a furious and overwhelming cannonade as now began and continued for three hours. It was made with more than four times their number of guns and troops.  Forty-seven guns and mortars were afterward, in an hour's time, joined by eight more gums of the heaviest calibre from the monitors, assisting with their formidable cross-fire. The land attack was commanded by Brigadier-General T. Seymour.

The reply of the Confederate batteries was not immediate, as they were taken much by surprise; nor was it effective against such odds. Guns were disabled and casualties were very frequent. The infantry supports occupied the main line of rifle-pits to the rear of the works, with only a picket-guard at Oyster Point. But when the troops of Strong's brigade appeared in boats coming from the cover of Folly Island into the inlet and [90] advancing on Morris Island, the Confederate batteries were put to better use than before, firing upon the flotilla and sinking a

launch ; then the infantry, under Major G. W. Mclver, moved forward to meet the attack by occupying the advanced rifle-pits near the water. This was about seven o'clock.

On came the boats, using their howitzers and aided by a fire from the left of the Folly Island batteries specially directed by the officer in command, Lieutenant-Colonel R. H. Jackson, upon the infantry forming to dispute the landing. One division of the boats, led by four companies of the Seventh Connecticut, under Lieutenant-Colonel D. C. Rodman, made gallantly for Oyster Point, and carried, after a short resistance, the rifle-pits in that vicinity. Another division, with the Sixth Connecticut, Colonel J. L. Chatfield commanding, kept on down the inlet to the south-eastern point of the island, where it landed under cover of high ground in perfect safety, as the Confederate guns could not be depressed sufficiently to bear on the spot. (Lieutenant-Colonel L. Meeker's report.) With a charge from this point, and but little loss, the Sixth Connecticut captured the nearest batteries, while, converging toward the middle of the island, the other (the main) column, led by the Seventh Connecticut and comprising also the Forty-eighth New York, Ninth Maine, Third New Hampshire, and Seventy-sixth Pennsylvania, took battery after battery, and drove the infantry support out of their main line of rifle-pits in full retreat up the sandy length of the island toward Fort Wagner.

The Confederates fought their batteries as long as they could under Captain Mitchel and Captain Macbeth, the latter being wounded and captured; but the extreme heat of the day, combined with the overpowering fire of the enemy's guns, told disastrously on the small force both of artillery and infantry, so that Colonel Graham could do nothing but give the order to retreat. 150 wounded or exhausted' men, with Captain Macbeth and Lieutenants Bee and Guerard, were made prisoners, the total loss, killed, wounded, and missing, being reported by

General Ripley at 294. Among the killed or mortally wounded were Captain Charles T. Haskell, Jr., First South Carolina Infantry, Lieutenant John S. Bee, First South Carolina Artillery, [91] Lieutenant T. H. Dalrymple, Twenty-first South Carolina volunteers, and Assistant Engineer Langdon Cheves. The Union loss was 107, Captain L. H. Lent, of the Forty-eighth New York volunteers, being among the killed.

The retreat of the Confederates over the heavy sand toward Fort Wagner, nearly three miles of toilsome effort under a broiling sun was at length covered by that work and the arrival of seven companies from Lieutenant-Colonel P. H. Nelson's Seventh battalion of South Carolina volunteers, under Major James H. Rion; the retreat being followed up by the four monitors, close in to the beach, as far as Wagner itself.

General Gilmore's account:

Gilmore begins with a lengthy footnote responding to the criticism that an attack on James Island would have directly threatened Charleston and therefore would have been more efficient.  Gilmore replies that his forces were no match for the larger and fortified Confederate forces.  Henry Little will later argue in his book that the construction of the Swamp Angel battery and the arrival of longer range artillery, as well as the USS New Ironsides, would have ultimately made Wagner indefensible, which indeed was ultimately the case.

  * The question has been asked why the route across James Island from Stono River, the same that Brigadier-General Benham attempted, was not selected to operate upon.  The answer is simple. The enemy had more troops available for the defence of Charleston than we had for the attack. The general in-chief in the preliminary discussions of the project, had mentioned ten thousand men as the approximate number that could be collected in the department of the South for this operation. The force actually got together there did not vary much from eleven thousand five hundred men, including engineers and artillerists. Upon Morris Island, on account of its narrowness, this force was ample, and it was not until the command had been reduced one-third by sickness and casualties that reinforcements were asked for. But James Island presents a different case. There our progress would soon have been arrested by the concentration of a superior force in our front. Upon Morris Island both parties had all the force that could be employed with advantage. Our superiority in artillery, ashore and afloat-particularly in the use of mortars in the trenches—the successful application of new devices, tlie energy and skill of our engineers, and a steadily maintained initiative, gave us the controlling elements of success. Moreover, according to the programme of joint operations, the demolition of Fort Sumter was what the land forces had to accomplish, and that could be done with more easy and certainty from Morris Inland than from any other position. James Inland was too wide to operate upon, with a fair promise of success, with our small force.—Q. A. G. (1865:23-24).

Gilmore's account follows, including his Confidential Orders for July 9 and 10, 1863:

DESCENT UPON MORRIS ISLAND, JULY 10, 1863.

54. The storming of a fortified position, except when preceded by the slow operations of a regular siege, which, besides partially or entirely silencing the fire of the enemy's works, will also enable the attacking column to get very near the enemy under cover before the final assault is made, is always an operation attended with imminent peril in its execution, and great uncertainty in its results. The best troops can seldom be made to advance under the fire of even a few well-served pieces of artillery. The hazard of such an undertaking, great as it is under ordinary circumstances, when both parties operate on firm ground, becomes immeasurably augmented when the assaulting column has to approach in small boats from a distant point, exposed to full view and constant artillery fire, disembark and form upon an open beach in the presence of the enemy, and finally advance to the attack under the combined fire of artillery and small-arms.

55. Yet these were the difficult conditions of the problem so successfully solved in the descent upon Morris Island on the 10th day of July. 

56. It was known from deserters and fugitives that the enemy had there in position from ten to twelve guns of various calibres, and that these were so arranged in batteries of single pieces, that they each covered with their fire, not only the north end of Folly Island held by our advanced pickets, and the main ship-channel abreast of Morris Island, but could be so traversed as to sweep the entire length of Lighthouse Inlet, which separates the two islands.

57. Three methods of conducting the assault suggested themselves:

First, To place the men in small boats in Stono River, tow them out to sea, and land them in the surf at daybreak on the sea front of Morris Island;

Second, To accumulate on the north end of Folly Island the boats required for the assaulting column, keep them concealed there until the moment of attack, and then launch them under fire, embark the men, and cross over;

Third, To embark the men in Folly River, and pass in the night-time, during high tide, through the shallow creeks into Lighthouse Inlet and make the assault from that direction. This last-named method of attack was adopted.

58. In the mean time, between the middle of June and the Gth of July, ordnance and ordnance stores were quietly accumulated at Folly Island.

59. The following armament was secretly placed in position on the north end of Folly Island, completely masked from the enemy's view by sand ridges and undergrowth. The object to be secured by this powerful array of guns was threefold, viz., First, To operate against and, if possible, dismount the enemy's guns nearest the place where the landing would have to be made; Second, To cover the debarkation of the troops; and, Third, To protect their retreat to the boats in case of repulse. This last-named condition was considered by far the most important of the three.

Battery. No. of Guns. Kind of Guns.

60. The duty of constructing these batteries was assigned to Brigadier-General L. Vogdes. The task was by no means easy, and to its successful execution our subsequent triumphs were due in no small degree.

61. It was necessary that the attack on Morris Island should be a surprise in order to insure success. Secresy was therefore an essential element in the preparations. Most of the work on the batteries, and all the transportation to them, was accomplished at night, and in silence. Moreover, all signs of work had to be carefully concealed by day. One fortunate circumstance favored these operations. A blockade-runner had been chased ashore just south of the entrance to Lighthouse Inlet, within point-blank range of our batteries, and while the enemy on Morris Island were industriously engaged in wrecking this vessel night and day, (an operation which we could easily have prevented,) our batteries were quietly and rapidly pushed forward to completion. They were ready to open fire on the 6th July.

62. The fact that forty-seven pieces of artillery, with two hundred rounds of ammunition for each gun, and provided with suitable parapets, splinter-proof shelters, and magazines, were secretly placed in battery in a position within speaking distance of the enemy's pickets, exposed to a flank and reverse view from their tall observatories on James Island, and to a flank view at pistol range from the wreck, furnishes by no means' the least interesting and instructive incident of this campaign.

63. Meanwhile, during the week ending July 8th, additional troops, comprising Brigadier-General Terry's division, about four thousand strong, and Brigadier General Strong's brigade, about two thousand five hundred strong, were quietly accumulated on Folly Island under cover of darkness.

64. The buoys at the entrance to Stono River, where the channel was narrow and crooked, with but five feet of water at low tide, were lighted up at night, and all transports carrying troops were ordered to enter after dark, land their men, and depart before daylight in the morning. Sutlers' schooners were ordered away, and all appearance of preparations for offensive operations was carefully suppressed. Upon General Vogdes' defensive works on Folly Island a semblance of great activity was conspicuously displayed. Everything being in readiness, the following order was issued:

65. CONFIDENTIAL INSTRUCTIONS.

Headquarters Department Of The South,
Folly Island, July 8th, 1863.

I. An attack upon Morris Island will be made at the rising of the moon to-night, by Brigadier-General Strong's brigade of Brigadier-General Seymour's division. This force will be embarked in small boats immediately after sunset, and will pass through Folly Island Creek to and across Lighthouse Inlet.

A small detachment from this force will enter the creek to the west of Morris Island, and will land just north of the old lighthouse, seize the batteries there, * and, if possible, turn them upon the enemy's encampment north of them. The main column will land from Lighthouse Inlet, carry the batteries on the south end of Morris Island, and advance to the support of the detachment above mentioned. Two regiments and some field artillery will be held in readiness on the extreme north end of Folly Island to be pushed over as reinforcemeuts. To this end General Strong will send his boats back as soon as he has disembarked his command.

II. At the same time General Terry, with all his division, except the One Hundredth New York Volunteers, will ascend the Stono River under convoy of the navy, and make a strong demonstration on James Island, but will not unnecessarily hazard any portion of his command. Perhaps one or two regiments only need be disembarked. These should be pushed forward as skirmishers under cover of the navy.

IIL A naval force is expected to enter the main channel abreast of Morris Island, by or before sunrise to-morrow morning, to co-operate with the land forces.

IV. Should the night attack fail from any cause, the assaulting column will withdraw to Folly Island, sending their boats into Folly Island Creek. In that event the batteries on the north end of Folly Island will open at daybreak, or as soon thereafter as practicable.

Brigadier-General Seymour will arrange the details.
By order of

Brigadier-General Q. A. Gillmore.
W. L. M. Burger,
Assistant-Adjutant- General.

66. Colonel Serrell of the New York Volunteer Engineers had received orders to remove, before daybreak on the 9 th, enough of the piles, which the enemy had previously placed across the creek which connects Lighthouse Inlet with Folly Island Creek, to allow the column in the small boats to pass through.

67. The batteries on the north end of Folly Island were also ordered to be unmasked, by opening out the embrasures and cutting away the brushwood in front of them....

68. About midnight on the 8th it was determined, for various reasons, the principal one of which was the unseaworthy condition of our boats, to defer the attack until the next night. A sufficient number of piles had been removed to afford a passage for the boats, but the work of unmasking the batteries had not progressed far enough to expose them to the view, or attract the attention of the enemy.

 69. In the mean time Brigadier-General Terry's command, of about three thousand eight hundred men, had proceeded up the Stono River on the afternoon of the 8th, and was confronting the enemy on the lower end of James Island. The immediate effect of this demonstration, as subsequently ascertained, was to draw off a portion of the enemy's force on Morris Island.

The following order was then issued on the afternoon of the 9th, and full detailed instructions for the assault given verbally to Generals Seymour and Strong.

70. CONFIDENTIAL INSTRUCTIONS.

Headquarters Department Of The South,
Folly Island, S. C, July 9th, 1863.

I. The attack on Morris Island, ordered for this morning but postponed in consequence of the inclemency of the weather and other unfavorable circumstances, will take place to-morrow morning at break of day, by opening our batteries at the north end of Folly Island.

General Strong's brigade, or so much of it as the small boats can accommodate, will embark to-night and hold itself in Folly Island Creek, ready to move forward and at the proper time occupy the south end of Morris Island.

II. Lieutenant - Commanding Francis W. Bunce, United States Navy, with four navy howitzer launches, will approach Lighthouse Inlet at daybreak, by way of Folly Island Creek, and engage the enemy's rifle-pits and batteries on Morris Island in flank and reverse, choosing his own position. He will cover General Strong's landing.

III. Two regiments of infantry, a battery of light artillery, and five Requa's rifle batteries,* will be held in readiness to reinforce General Strong promptly.

Brigadier-General Seymour will arrange and order all details.

By order of

Brigadier-General Q. A. Gillmore,
Ed. W. Smith,
Assistant-Adjutant- General.

* For a description of the Requa batteries see Report of Major T. B. Brooks, A. D. C. and Assistant Engineer.

71. In pursuance of the above order, nearly two thousand men of General Strong's brigade were embarked in small boats in Folly River on the evening of the 9th, and at daybreak on the following morning the head of the column had reached Lighthouse Inlet, where it was halted. The boats kept close to the east shore of the creek, and were screened by the marsh grass from the view of the enemy on Morris Island.

72. Our batteries on Folly Island opened shortly after daybreak, and were served rapidly for about two hours, when I ordered General Strong to land and make the assault by putting two regiments ashore at Oyster Point, and the balance of his command on the firm land lower down. The landing was promptly effected, under a hot fire of artillery and musketry, under which our troops did not falter for a moment. All the enemy's batteries on the south end of Morris Island were gallantly and successively carried.

73. By 9 o'clock A.m. we occupied three-fourths of the island, and our skirmishers were within musket range of Fort Wagner. The heat being intense, and the troops exhausted, offensive operations were suspended for the day.

74. Brigadier-General Seymour was ordered to carry Fort Wagner by assault at daybreak on the following morning. The attempt failed....

Siege Operations on Morris and Folly Islands, S. C., July 7, 1863 - Capt. Paul Whipple and the Seventh New Hampshire in the Civil War

The Seventh New Hampshire continues its siege operations and prepares to invade Morris Island for the coming assaults on Fort Wagner:

July 7, the regimental cooks were ordered to cook three days' rations, and from this order the boys drew their own conclusions; on the evening of the 8th, we were ordered to the front on Little Folly Island, at the batteries as a support, in very light marching order, with only equipments and canteens, and we were ordered to stop there on the 9th, as there were no troops with which to relieve us. A blockade-runner, the "Ruby," had, previous to the arrival of the Seventh on Folly Island, been wrecked off Lighthouse Inlet, and very near the northeast end of Little Folly Island, on which the rebels had a look-out: this wreck was visited nearly every day by parties of the rebel soldiers, and was within easy rifle range of our pickets, who were not allowed to tire a shot, and were obliged to keep concealed from view. [106]

Folly Island, S.C. (vicinity of Charleston). Beached remains of the British-built blockade runner Ruby, run aground after passing the Federal squadron, June 10-11, 1863. 
"We regret to say that the steamer Ruby, Capt. PEAT, from Nassau, got ashore on Folly Island breakers, near this bar, on Wednesday night. A large portion of the cargo was thrown overboard, and everything possible done to get her off, but without success. The Yankees on Folly Island having discovered her early on Thursday, opened on her from a battery. Capt. PEAT was then compelled to set her on fire and abandon her, and she afterwards blew up. While Capt. PEAT and his crew were coming ashore to Morris Island, they were shot at by the Yankees with cannon and small arms, and the balls came dropping around them in every direction". New York Times, The Destruction of the Blockade-runner Ruby. From the Wilmington (N.C.) Journal, June 16. Published: July 12, 1863

So secretly had our forces constructed their works that in an official report of Brigadier-General Ripley, commanding the Confederate forces around Charleston, about this time he states, " that up to the 8th or 9th of July, the enemy, so far as ascertained, had constructed no works on Little Folly except to shelter his pickets from our shells." This was a day or two only before the attack, and those thoroughly well-built batteries for forty-seven guns and mortars had been under construction since the 14th of June, without any discovery. With lookout stations on the ruins of the old lighthouse, Morris Island, on a mast- head of the wrecked blockade-runner "Ruby," off Lighthouse Inlet, and at Secessionville, on James Island, there had as yet been no discovery of our works.

In his book entitled "The Defense of Charleston Harbor," Maj. John Johnson (Confederate), speaking of the opening of the tire from the rebel batteries on the south end of Morris Island, on June 12, says: " It may well be asked. Why was not the tire of the Confederates more vigorously maintained ? Only their confidence that nothing serious was meant by the Federals can account for the oversight, while it cannot excuse it." While the dense wood and underbrush and the sand-hills afforded good concealment to the working parties, Major Johnson says: " But it was chiefly to a ruse practiced on the artillerists of Morris Island that the concealment was due. A blockade-running steamer grounded and became a wreck off the inlet. When General Vodges advanced a few field- guns on the beach to shell the wreck, the Confederate batteries drove them off and thenceforward, their men being unmolested in plundering the cargo, the impression was conveyed to the Confederates that only a picket force was opposed to them." 

Henry F. W. Little. The Seventh Regiment New Hampshire Volunteers in the War of the Rebellion. Seventh New Hampshire Veterans Association, Concord, N. H., 1896, pages 105-106.

Seventh New Hampshire's Colors. (National Archive)